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Abstract
This article examines the effects of Brexit on the internal boundaries and territorial future of the United 
Kingdom (UK). Divergent Brexit preferences, coupled with the process of negotiating and preparing for 
Brexit, have raised new questions about the ability of the UK to remain united. Focusing upon Scotland 
and Northern Ireland, where territorial challenges are most acute, the article draws upon and adapts 
Hirschman’s voice, exit and loyalty framework to examine the strategic choices and options faced by 
institutional actors in each case when determining constitutional and political options in response to Brexit. 
The article contends that, while credible exit threats were used to bolster voice in the Brexit negotiations, 
the Brexit vote and subsequent process have exposed the limitations of territorial voice, and unleashed new 
exit dynamics. We enhance the framework by exploring the concept of re-entry, exploring the contrasting 
paths these territories would face to re-enter the European Union (EU).
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Introduction
While the United Kingdom’s (UK) external borders with the European Union (EU) have been the 
focus of much Brexit scholarship, the actual and symbolic significance of the UK’s internal territo-
rial boundaries is the focus of this article. The narrow 52% majority who voted Leave in the 2016 
referendum masked deep territorial divisions in Brexit preferences, raising new questions about the 
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ability of the ‘kingdom’ to remain united. We focus on Scotland and Northern Ireland, where the 
territorial issues raised by Brexit are most acute.
The plurinational character of the UK is at least partially recognized and embodied in its system 
of asymmetrical multi-level government. Since 1999, Scotland and Northern Ireland, along with 
Wales, have had their own elected legislatures and governments, with varying degrees of devolved 
political autonomy, but there is no legislative devolution in England. As a strategy of accommodat-
ing national minorities and, in Northern Ireland, of conflict resolution, devolution has been largely 
successful, despite periodic disruptions in Northern Ireland. Yet, devolution never eliminated disa-
greement over the UK’s constitutional future. It also generated an opportunity to govern for those 
seeking a new constitutional order, including the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) 
and Sinn Féin, the most radical pro-Irish reunification party. The 2014 Scottish independence ref-
erendum, spearheaded by the SNP government, represented the union’s biggest test since devolu-
tion. Arguably, Brexit poses even stiffer territorial challenges.
The Brexit process was initiated after a simple majority in a UK-wide ballot voted for the UK 
to leave the EU. That two of the four constituent territories voted Remain had no bearing on the 
outcome. In both Scotland and Northern Ireland, the grievances resulting from having to leave 
the EU, despite a clear majority in each case voting Remain, have been reinforced by the frus-
trated efforts of key political and institutional actors to influence the Brexit process. The UK 
government’s pursuit of a ‘hard’ Brexit, which entails leaving both the EU customs union and 
internal market, heightened territorial anxieties, and contributed to the resurgence of nationalist 
claims for a new independence referendum in Scotland and a border poll (unity referendum) in 
Ireland.
In examining the strategic responses of territorial actors to Brexit grievances, we have drawn 
upon and adapted Hirschman’s voice, exit and loyalty framework. Hirschman’s original study 
focused on how consumers adapt to dissatisfaction, but his framework has been frequently deployed 
to aid understanding of political behaviour (Dowding et al., 2000), including by Hirschman him-
self (Hirschman, 1993). Most of these studies focused on the behaviour of individuals or groups of 
individuals, with exit associated, for example, with member or voter decisions to leave a political 
party, service users leaving a service provider or citizens leaving a country (Sharp, 1984; Weber, 
2011). Instead, we examine collective exit and voice as strategic constitutional and political options 
facing sub-state territories. We also adapt Hirschman’s framework by adding a category of re-entry, 
with a particular focus on the cases under discussion of re-entry into the EU. Our unit of analysis 
is thus the territorial community. For the most part, this is examined in the actions and discourse of 
the governing administrations and political elites representing these communities, but we also 
consider the aggregate views of the communities themselves, expressed in voting behaviour and 
survey data. Our key aim was to determine the effectiveness of these territorial communities in 
using the credible threat of exit from the state to enhance their voice and influence over the Brexit 
process.
Although the challenges we discuss are set within the particular context of the UK and Brexit, 
they provide broader insights into the accommodation and marginalization of territorial voices 
within a plurinational state. In particular, the case studies reveal how the existing balance of voice, 
exit and loyalty can be disrupted in the face of an exogeneous or endogenous shock. In the UK’s 
asymmetrical setting, where Brexit represents an endogenous shock, our analysis portrays a story 
of deep complexity in the articulation and influence of voice, and multifarious challenges and 
incongruities in relation to Scotland’s and Northern Ireland’s ability to effectively employ an exit 
strategy. Exit is not inevitable in either case, and so any challenges of re-entry may not arise. But 
their contrasting exit paths and routes to re-entry into the EU shape the dynamics of contemporary 
exit debates, and the options associated with a new constitutional order.
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Territorial dissatisfaction after Brexit: Voice, exit and re-entry
In his seminal essay, Hirschman posited exit and voice as alternative strategies facing consumers 
or members of an organization who become dissatisfied with the product or service on offer. Exit 
is the act of leaving, in expectation that a better offer can be found elsewhere. With voice, con-
sumers or members of an organization air their grievances from within, ‘kicking up a fuss’ in the 
hope of improving products, practices or outputs that are the source of dissatisfaction (Hirschman, 
1970: 30).
Hirschman principally regarded exit and voice as having an inverse relationship: when exit is 
readily available, it undermines the use of voice as a strategy to achieve change. Conversely, 
enhancing the channels through which voice can be exerted can reduce the incentive to exit. In 
contrast to voice, which requires time, effort and collective organization, Hirschman regarded exit 
as the easier option. This rested on an assumption that exit, whether applied to a consumer seeking 
a better product or service elsewhere, or a citizen seeking to emigrate to a new country, is an act of 
individuals (Hirschman, 1993: 194). Voice, by contrast, is a public activity that thrives on collec-
tive action. Indeed, Hirschman regarded exit as an option more readily available to consumers in a 
competitive marketplace than to social or political contexts. In the latter context, voice may be ‘the 
only way in which dissatisfied customers or members can react whenever the exit option is una-
vailable’ (Hirschman, 1970: 33).
Applied to the context of territorial politics, however, exit can be considered a plausible, albeit 
difficult, collective enterprise to exit from a system of state government. These communities may 
strive for a partial exit that expands their territorial self-government within the state. Alternatively, 
exit ambitions might include the more radical option of leaving one state to establish or, exception-
ally, join another.
Hirschman regarded the state, alongside the family and the church, among those organizations 
where ‘the virtual unavailability of the threat of exit’ will incentivize voice (Hirschman, 1970: 
97–98). Certainly, exit options are hardly readily available; few states make provision for secession 
in their constitutions and, even where they do, the risks associated with exit are likely to be very 
high (Lachapelle and Qvortrup, 2020; Lechner and Ohr, 2011). Nevertheless, in plurinational 
states, which house multiple nations, often with overlapping boundaries, the territorial integrity of 
the political community is more likely to be challenged. For Rokkan (1974), one of the first to 
adapt Hirschman’s framework to a political setting, boundary-setting and closure are essential 
prerequisites that enable a state to claim sovereignty over its territory and population. Internal 
cultural, territorial, and/or political–institutional boundaries associated with plurinational political 
systems can make it more difficult for states to stake that claim. Exit options, especially when the 
subject of intense party competition, become more viable.
For Hirschman, the choice to exercise voice or exit is conditioned by loyalty; ‘loyalty holds exit 
at bay and activates voice’ (1970: 78). Even where the exit option is available, dissatisfied consum-
ers or citizens may be more inclined to use voice to seek change from within when they feel a sense 
of attachment to the organization in question. The attitudes and behaviour of citizens, in turn, shape 
and constrain those institutional actors, including governments, who act in their name. Loyalty to 
the state, in the form of national identity or attachment, is more powerful than loyalty to a product 
or a brand. For one, the alternative options are fewer. Moreover, national identity is forged through 
decades and generations of shared institutions, experiences, customs and narratives, and the expec-
tation of a shared future. Ferrera (2019: 177) described this as a process of ‘bonding’, resulting in 
‘a set of we-feelings that spread throughout the population in the wake of continuous mutual inter-
action, which generates material interdependence and cultural/emotional ligatures’. Yet, in plurina-
tional states, the development of territorial identity is more complex, with multiple nation-building 
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processes at play, generating bonds to more than one territorial community. Loyalty to the state as 
a political community cannot be presumed, especially when set against loyalty to a nation or com-
munity within the state. In such contexts, the role of loyalty to the state in constraining exit in 
favour of voice may carry less force.
However, voice is at its most potent when combined with a credible threat of exit. In plurina-
tional states, where a sub-state territorial community is capable of mounting a challenge to the 
state’s capacity to exercise legitimate sovereignty over the entire territory, a credible threat of exit 
can enhance voice. That could give sub-state territories and their representatives opportunity to 
express their dissatisfaction and to influence policy choices. From both the perspective of the ter-
ritory seeking influence, and the state seeking to maintain its territorial integrity, the success of 
voice as a strategy may require that voice to be heard and responded to, with evidence of influence. 
As Hirschman observed, ‘the barrier to exit constituted by loyalty is of finite height’ (1970: 79). At 
some point, faced with continued deterioration and widening disagreement despite increased use 
of voice as a form of protest, some of those loyalists (save those for whom exit would never be 
contemplated) may opt for exit (Hirschman, 1970: 87–89).
In the field of territorial politics, or indeed any public context, exit is never final: ‘one remains 
a consumer of the output or at least of its external effects from which there is no escape’ (Hirschman, 
1970: 104). Although briefly mentioned by Hirschman, re-entry after exit was not a significant 
component of his framework, but we contend it is more important when it comes to territorial 
politics.
Re-entry has two dimensions. Rather than ‘separation’ from the state, exit for modern-day 
nationalists is often presented as an opportunity to re-enter the relationship with the ‘home’ state 
on the basis of equality. However much the exiting party may wish to negotiate an equal partner-
ship, they are (usually) the weaker partner in an asymmetric relationship, and they can no longer 
access the threat of exit from the state to enhance influence in negotiations with their counterparts. 
For some disgruntled territorial communities with irredentist features, the ambition is not to expand 
self government or establish a new state, but to join a country that many regard as their kin. These 
ties may be the legacy of an historic partition of a formerly unified territory, or the result of cultural 
affinities and social interactions that have nurtured a national identity that spans state boundaries 
(Brubaker, 1996; Lecours, 2020; Rokkan, 1999). For irredentists, the credibility of the exit threat 
will be conditioned by the attitudes of the kin-state and its willingness to redraw its own territorial 
boundaries to facilitate the re-entry of the territorial community in question.
Re-entry also has an external dimension. Although the EU carried the potential to enable sover-
eignty and political authority to be shared and pooled above and below the state without the neces-
sity of independent statehood (Keating, 2001), it has made exit options for Europe’s sub-state 
nations more viable. Despite the absence of a clear legal route to a territory becoming a new mem-
ber state by exiting another, the EU represents a secure external framework through which a transi-
tion to independence can take place. For the most prominent pro-independence movements in 
Europe, re-entry to the EU as an independent member state is an integral part of their ambition.
Applying Hirschman’s framework to Scotland and Northern 
Ireland
Power allocation across the three devolved territories in the UK conforms to a reserved powers 
model. The devolved institutions are free to legislate on matters that are not explicitly ‘reserved’ or 
(in the Northern Ireland settlement) ‘excepted’ to the UK parliament. Across all of the UK’s devo-
lution settlements, external affairs are an exclusive competence of the UK parliament, leaving the 
McEwen and Murphy 5
devolved institutions without a constitutional voice in the Brexit process. However, the legally 
non-binding intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding and concordats that accompanied 
devolution have long recognized the legitimate interests of the devolved institutions in external 
relations, and included commitment to involve them ‘as directly and fully as possible’ when deci-
sion-making on EU matters touched upon devolved matters (UK Government et al., 2013).
We expected the interaction of voice, exit and loyalty to work in different ways between the two 
cases. In Scotland, the SNP had been in government since 2007, albeit as a minority since 2016. It 
had a coherent narrative and clear exit ambition: Scottish independence within the EU. The UK 
constitution does not include a constitutional right to secession for Scotland, but nor does it explic-
itly prevent it. When the SNP was re-elected with an overall majority in 2011, with a manifesto 
commitment to hold an independence referendum, the UK government respected the mandate, 
facilitated the referendum and committed to respecting the outcome. In the 2014 referendum that 
followed, 55% voted against the exit option. But, in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 referen-
dum, the Scottish First Minister underlined that Brexit represented a ‘material change of circum-
stances’ in which that decision was made, and thus justified a new vote (Sturgeon, 2016a). As the 
clearest institutional voice of Scotland in the UK, the SNP government assumed the role of the 
voice of a Scotland that faced the injustice of ‘being taken out of the EU against our will’ (Sturgeon, 
2016a).
In Northern Ireland, a credible prospect of exit in the form of Irish reunification is provided for 
in the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. This agreement, endorsed by the UK and Irish gov-
ernments and most political parties in Northern Ireland (excluding the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP)), and backed by popular consent in referendums north and south, paved the way for an end 
to sectarian conflict. It led to the creation of a legislative assembly alongside new north–south and 
east–west institutional relations. It also recognised that it is ‘for the people of the island of Ireland 
alone. . . to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concur-
rently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland’, placing a ‘binding obligation’ on 
both the UK and Irish governments to respect and give effect to their decision (UK Government, 
1998).
Northern Ireland’s coherence on the exit option, however, is undermined by deep and enduring 
political divisions between unionists and nationalists, with the former supporting retention of the 
constitutional link between Northern Ireland and Britain, and the latter aspiring to a united Ireland. 
The power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive, which seeks to manage and moderate tensions 
between the two communities, includes both nationalist and unionist political parties. The divi-
sions between the two political traditions were mirrored in Brexit debates. This made Brexit a 
highly contested and constitutionally sensitive issue that militated against the articulation of a 
coherent Northern Ireland voice. This situation was further impaired by the absence of a function-
ing Executive during the critical phase of EU withdrawal negotiations. The credibility of the exit 
threat has also been hampered by the Irish government’s support for existing territorial arrange-
ments enshrined in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (Irish Government, 2020) and its, at best, 
lukewarm support for the Irish unity agenda.
We thus had contrasting expectations regarding the interplay of voice and exit in our two cases. 
We expected the Brexit vote to have reinforced the threat of exit in Scotland, in turn bolstering 
Scotland’s voice in Brexit negotiations. By contrast, we expected the internal divisions exposed in 
the Brexit process, combined with the lack of devolved government for a 3-year period, to have 
weakened Northern Ireland’s ability to convincingly wield the exit option to influence the UK’s 
Brexit policy. Despite these internal divisions, we anticipated that Brexit’s interplay with border 
politics and Northern Ireland’s identity conflict would have intensified nationalist exit narratives, 
with a clear route to re-entry in the form of Irish reunification and EU membership. By contrast, 
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we expected added complexity in Scotland’s routes to re-entry, both to a renewed partnership with 
the UK after independence and accession to the EU.
Exit from Brexit: Exit strategies after the EU referendum
Scotland recorded the highest remain vote (62%) of the four constituent territories of the UK. 
Every local authority counting area recorded a majority for Remain, adding to the symbolic signifi-
cance of the outcome, ranging from 50.1% in Moray to 74.4% in the City of Edinburgh (Electoral 
Commission, 2016). The 56% Remain vote in Northern Ireland also masked significant geographic 
variations, ranging from 78.3% for Remain in the Foyle constituency to 62.2% for Leave in North 
Antrim. Remain support was strongest in Belfast and in constituencies close to the Irish border 
(Murphy, 2018: 53). Both Scotland and Northern Ireland displayed similar demographic trends to 
those identified in England and Wales: those on lower incomes, those with fewer educational quali-
fications, older voters, and those opposed to immigration were more likely to vote Leave wherever 
they lived in the UK (Curtice, 2016; Garry, 2016). There were simply fewer Leave voters overall.
Where Northern Ireland stands out is in the strong ethnonational basis of the vote. Surveys sug-
gested that 85% of Catholics voted Remain compared with 40% of Protestants, and 88% of those 
identifying themselves as nationalists voted Remain, compared with only 34% of those identifying 
as unionists (Garry et al., 2017). In Scotland, by contrast, identity was related to Brexit preferences, 
but in a less divisive way. Henderson et al. found strong Scottish identity, relative to British iden-
tity, to be a predictor of the Remain vote in Scotland, but with far less effect than the much stronger 
explanatory power of English identity among Leavers in England (Henderson et al., 2020). The 
prevalence of Scottish identity across the political spectrum has traditionally made it a relatively 
weak predictor of vote choice (McCrone, 2017).
The results of the referendum generated fresh and rather distinctive ‘exit’ debates in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. Scotland’s exit strategy is most evident in the SNP government’s demand for 
a new independence referendum, with some evidence to suggest growing support among the wider 
population. Opinion polls have tracked the dynamics in support for independence since the 2016 
Brexit referendum (see Figure 1). By the time the UK formally left the EU at the end of January 
2020, the split between Yes and No in a hypothetical independence referendum stood at around 
50:50 (excluding those undecided). The rise in support for independence in the year leading to ‘exit 
Figure 1. Trends in support for Scottish independence, 2016–2020.
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day’ occurred almost entirely amongst those who backed Remain in the Brexit referendum (Curtice, 
2020). Against the backdrop of Covid-19, support increased further, with polls recording sustained 
independence majorities. The demand for Scots to have a right to determine their future is central 
to the SNP’s ambitions as it heads toward re-election.
There are considerable legal barriers confronting the exit option in Scotland’s case, however. 
Under the devolution settlement, the authority to hold a referendum intended to generate constitu-
tional change lies with the UK parliament. In 2012, after months of negotiation, an intergovern-
mental agreement saw the Scottish Parliament temporarily empowered to legislate for a referendum 
that would be beyond legal doubt. Similar requests for a transfer of power have been rejected by 
Boris Johnson and his predecessor, Theresa May, on the basis that the issue had already been set-
tled in 2014. Despite its electoral dominance in Scotland, the SNP cannot force concessions from 
a government not reliant on its votes in the House of Commons. The party thus puts its trust in 
continued electoral success and growing support for independence making the case to hold a new 
referendum irrefutable.
The politics of exit play out rather differently in Northern Ireland. Nationalist claims are not 
secessionist but irredentist, and are made within the context of a deeply divided community with a 
recent history of sectarian conflict. The 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement has been central to 
peace and relative stability in Northern Ireland, but Brexit has threatened that stability and led to a 
new discourse on Irish unity north and south of the Irish border (Connolly and Doyle, 2019: 228). 
In the immediate aftermath of the 2016 referendum, Sinn Féin party chairman, Declan Kearney, 
noted: ‘We have a situation where the north is going to be dragged out on the tails of a vote in 
England . . . Sinn Féin will now press our demand, our long-standing demand, for a border poll’ 
(thejournal.ie, 24 June 2016).
On the question of Irish unity, survey data is sensitive to methodology, wording and political 
context (Connolly and Doyle, 2019). As indicated in Figure 2, polls conducted since the Brexit 
referendum have put support for Irish unity between 21% and 52%. Online polls identify a smaller 
proportion of ‘don’t knows’ and suggest stronger support for Irish unity than those conducted in 
person, but it is not possible to determine which method is most representative of voters’ views. In 
analysis derived from both survey data and a specially designed one-day citizens’ assembly, Garry 
et al. (2020) observed increased sympathy for reunification amongst participants, linked to the 
effect of Brexit on the North–South border.


















































Source: Adapted from Donaghy (2020).
8 International Political Science Review 00(0)
Recent elections have also sharpened the focus on constitutional issues. Although Sinn Féin’s 
vote share fell in the 2019 UK general election, Northern Ireland elected more nationalist than 
unionist MPs for the first time (Tonge, 2020). Sinn Féin competes north and south of the Irish 
border and, in the 2020 Irish general election, it won 24% of first preference votes, more than any 
other party. During the campaign, the party had called for a border poll within 5 years, with a mani-
festo pledge to set up a parliamentary committee and an all-island Citizens’ Assembly, and produce 
a White Paper on reunification (Sinn Féin, 2020). Following the election, the new Irish government 
created a ‘Shared Island’ unit in the Department of the Taoiseach. It touches on some of the issues 
linked to the united Ireland narrative, but does not take a position on any future constitutional sce-
nario (BBC, 12 July 2020). In 2019, over 1,000 civil society representatives addressed an open 
letter to then Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Leo Varadkar, calling for a new conversation about the 
constitutional future of the island after Brexit (Irish Times, 4 November 2019). Despite some 
unionist leaders, including former DUP leader and First Minister, Peter Robinson, urging participa-
tion, unionist engagement with the exit discussion has been negligible.
In contrast to Scotland, the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement provides a legal route to exit for 
Northern Ireland. The mechanism, however, is not without ambiguity. The agreement gives respon-
sibility to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to initiate a referendum on Irish unity when it 
appears ‘likely’ to them that a majority of Northern Ireland’s electorate would support a united 
Ireland. However, neither the agreement nor the legislation which gave it domestic legal effect (the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998) specify precisely how this assessment should be conducted; for exam-
ple, whether opinion polls or election results should provide the measurement of support for Irish 
unity. Nor is there clarity in relation to the timing of referendums north and south. The calling of a 
border poll would undoubtedly be a moment of high political drama that would be potentially 
destabilising, illicit strong, contested reactions and possibly judicial review (Murray and 
O’Donoghue, 2019). The route to exit is also dependent on support in the Republic of Ireland. 
Article 3 of the Irish constitution states that Ireland can only be reunified with the consent of the 
north and the south.
Thus, whereas Scotland is divided politically over independence, the divide in Northern Ireland 
is ethnocultural. Yet, despite contrasting and ambiguous routes to exit, electoral success and rising 
support in both cases have enhanced the credibility of these respective exit threats. Alongside the 
prospect of increased instability in Northern Ireland, these exit threats have been used in efforts to 
influence the Brexit process.
Territorial voice and the Brexit process
Voice strategies were evident in both Scotland and Northern Ireland, but in different ways and with 
different effects. In Scotland, the credibility of the threat of exit in the wake of Scotland’s strong 
support to remain was used to bolster voice, in this instance as a complementary rather than an 
alternative strategy to exit. First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, called on the UK government to prove 
the worth of the union by finding ways ‘to demonstrate that Scotland’s voice can be heard, our 
wishes accommodated, and our interests protected within the UK’ (Sturgeon, 2016b). Arlene Foster 
and Martin McGuiness, then First Minister and Deputy First Minister, respectively, in the Northern 
Ireland Executive, also wrote to the Prime Minister to underline the key issues affecting Northern 
Ireland and their expectation of being ‘fully involved and represented in the negotiations’ concern-
ing the Irish border (Northern Ireland Executive, 2016).
In the months after the Brexit referendum, Prime Minister Theresa May seemed committed to 
enhancing the voice of devolved governments in the Brexit process. During a visit to the Scottish 
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First Minister, she declared a willingness to listen to options, insisting that she wanted ‘the Scottish 
government to be fully engaged in our discussion. . . I have already said that I won't be triggering 
Article 50 until I think that we have a UK approach and objectives for negotiations’ (BBC, 2016).
The four administrations agreed to create the Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) 
(JMC EN) with terms of reference designed to provide an opportunity to the devolved administra-
tions to voice their interests and shape the UK’s approach (see Joint Ministerial Committee [JMC], 
2016). It represented a new institutional channel through which the devolved administrations could 
exercise voice in UK policymaking and promised intergovernmental cooperation on a scale not 
previously seen since devolution (McEwen, 2017). Twenty meetings of the JMC (EN) were held 
between its inception and the signing of the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement.
However, opportunities for influence were largely limited to the domestic implications of Brexit 
rather than the negotiations over the UK’s withdrawal (McEwen, 2020). Short of the UK remaining 
in the EU, the Scottish government advocated for the whole of the UK to remain within the 
European single market and the EU customs union. In Scotland’s Place in Europe, it also suggested 
an alternative option where Scotland could be given special status to maintain its place within the 
European single market even if the UK government sought a different outcome for England and 
Wales (Scottish Government, 2016). There is little evidence that these proposals were given seri-
ous consideration by the UK government, nor were they subject to meaningful discussion within 
the joint ministerial committee (McEwen, 2020). The Scottish government was largely excluded 
from the process of formulating the UK’s Brexit policy and negotiating priorities. According to 
Scottish ministers, the Prime Minister’s ‘Article 50’ letter to President Donald Tusk, which trig-
gered the formal exit process, was neither shared nor agreed with devolved governments prior to 
being sent (Scottish Parliament, 2017).
Although the JMC (EN) continued to meet throughout most of the negotiations over with-
drawal, it became largely a forum in which devolved administrations voiced their frustrations. The 
gap between the declared UK objectives and the Scottish government’s preferences underlined the 
limited impact of the voice strategy in advancing what the Scottish government regarded as 
Scotland’s territorial interests. In a letter to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Michael 
Gove, on the eve of the UK’s formal departure from the EU, the Scottish Minister with responsibil-
ity for Brexit negotiations with the UK government, Michael Russell, asserted that:
the views of the Scottish Parliament, and indeed the people of Scotland, have been consistently ignored by 
the UK Government throughout the process of EU exit. . . there has been no meaningful engagement with 
the Scottish Government either over the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU or the future relationship 
(Scottish Government, 2020).
If the Scottish government’s voice was diminished in the Brexit process, an institutional voice for 
Northern Ireland was notable for its absence. Since 2007, the executive, when it functioned, has 
been led by the DUP and Sinn Féin. These parties were on opposing sides in the Brexit referendum, 
when the DUP championed a Leave vote while Sinn Féin strongly supported Remain. In the 7 
months between the EU referendum and the collapse of the executive in January 2017, there was 
only one substantial Brexit debate, on a motion calling for recognition of ‘special status’ for 
Northern Ireland in the EU withdrawal process. It was narrowly defeated by 46 to 47 (NIA, 2016), 
exposing opposing nationalist and unionist responses to Brexit. After January 2017, there were no 
ministers and no opportunities to pursue a strategy of institutional voice. Brexit also shifted and 
realigned Sinn Féin’s strategy, from support for power-sharing in the north to a clearer exit strategy 
that simultaneously leveraged for a border poll and Irish unity.
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An inability to coherently articulate a shared Northern Ireland voice was all the more striking 
given the centrality of the Irish border in Brexit negotiations. The Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee in the House of Commons noted in its inquiry into the collapse of devolved government 
that it ‘has been particularly unfortunate since it has meant the voice of Northern Ireland has not 
been heard in London and Brussels as loudly as that of Scotland and Wales during the Brexit pro-
cess’ (2018: 12). The political vacuum created by the suspension of the devolved institutions was 
partially filled by civil servants, but officials were severely constrained and unremittingly cautious 
in how they approached policy during this period. Intergovernmental relations on the island of 
Ireland were also disrupted as the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive automatically sus-
pended the North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC). The Irish government’s attempt to provide 
an alternative all-island forum for Northern Ireland voices to express their views on Brexit was met 
with resistance by the DUP and other unionists, who feared that it lent credence to the nationalist 
exit strategy.
Northern Ireland was not entirely devoid of representation and voice during the first phase of 
Brexit negotiations though. Following Theresa May’s failure to secure a majority at the 2017 gen-
eral election, the DUP’s 10 MPs used their balance of power to negotiate a Confidence and Supply 
Agreement with the Conservative government. This meant that, insofar as a Northern Ireland voice 
was being articulated, it was filtered through the DUP and therefore partisan and reflective of only 
some interests and constituencies in this divided territory. The Confidence and Supply Agreement 
committed the DUP to support the UK government’s Brexit policy. However, when different itera-
tions of the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement were perceived to threaten the territorial integrity of 
the UK, the DUP was vociferous in summoning its oppositional voice. This put the party decidedly 
at odds with nationalist and non-aligned parties in Northern Ireland who were supportive of Theresa 
May’s withdrawal legislation, in particular, the ‘backstop’ designed to ensure an open border on the 
island of Ireland.
The final UK–EU withdrawal deal of October 2019 dropped the ‘backstop’ provision and also 
patently ignored unionist voices, and was rejected by all swathes of political opinion in Northern 
Ireland. On 20 January 2020, the Northern Ireland Assembly – in one of its first votes following its 
3 year suspension – passed a motion withholding consent for the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) bill, 
the UK legislation giving legal effect to the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement. The position was 
agreed without dissent and was supported by both nationalist and unionist Members of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLAs), albeit from contrasting motivations. Unionists objected to provi-
sions in the protocol requiring customs and regulatory controls at the Irish Sea border, interpreted 
as undermining Northern Ireland’s constitutional position as an integral part of the UK. In contrast, 
nationalists and other non-aligned political parties’ opposition to Brexit and their dissatisfaction 
with the technical complexities involved in operationalising the protocol motivated their decision 
to withhold consent.
The MLAs’ decision was an expression of the procedural mechanism, more commonly known 
as the Sewel convention, that gives the devolved institutions the opportunity to give or withhold 
consent for UK legislation that affects their competences. This does not amount to a constitutional 
veto. The UK parliament is sovereign. It can make or unmake any laws, including in devolved 
areas. However, the convention that it will not do so in relation to devolved matters or competences 
without the expressed consent of the devolved institutions has become an important principle 
underpinning UK devolution. Within the parameters of the UK constitution, it is the quintessential 
institutional expression of territorial voice. In the event, all three devolved legislatures withheld 
their consent, the first time in the history of devolution that they have done so simultaneously. That 
this did nothing to sway or influence the withdrawal legislation exposes the limitations of the voice 
strategy when those to whom voice is targeted are not minded to heed it.
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Prospects for re-entry
Hirschman’s framework centred on the pulls of exit and voice as alternative choices for those left 
dissatisfied by a product, service or organization. Although Hirschman briefly considered re-entry, 
it was as a move back to the entity the individuals had left, in an expression of loyalty or a belief 
that the source of grievance had been addressed (Hirschman, 1970: 89). In the territorial communi-
ties under consideration here, re-entry would not be to the state they had left. In the Scottish case, 
re-entry would be sought to the EU, whilst simultaneously entering a new inter-state relationship 
with the rest of the UK, its closest neighbour economically, politically and culturally. For Irish 
nationalists, re-entry would be to the Ireland from which the north was partitioned in 1921 and, as 
a corollary, to the EU, given Ireland’s status as an EU member state. Of course, in each case, re-
entry is conditional upon exit, and both the prospects of, and the paths toward, re-entry belong in 
an uncertain future. However, Brexit has generated new challenges and opportunities associated 
with re-entry that merit examination for their capacity to shape ongoing exit debates.
In some respects, the route to re-entry to the EU for an independent Scotland is more straight-
forward than in 2014. Under such a scenario, Scotland would be compelled to follow the well-
established process of accession under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, subject to 
satisfying Copenhagen criteria for membership and securing the agreement of existing member 
states. This suggests accepting all rights and obligations of EU membership, unless there was an 
exceptional case for securing a derogation (Börzel et al., 2017). The SNP government is committed 
to maintaining continued alignment with EU regulations within its areas of competence in part, as 
noted by the First Minister, to ‘make it easier, when the time comes. . .for Scotland to return to the 
EU’ (Sturgeon, 2020). But there are many areas where EU regulations apply to policy fields that 
are beyond the competence of the Scottish Parliament. If UK–EU regulatory divergence increases 
over time, Scotland at the point of independence would have departed from the acquis by default. 
Adopting the acquis in its entirety would also require a departure from the 2013 independence 
vision, which assumed continuation of UK opt-outs, rejected the Euro for a currency union with 
the rest of the UK, and rejected the Schengen arrangements for continued inclusion in the UK–
Ireland Common Travel Area.
In other respects, the path to EU re-entry for Scotland is also more problematic as a result of 
Brexit. If Scotland was to accede to the EU as an independent member state, the Scottish–English 
border would become another external EU border. Even if, following the Irish precedent, an inde-
pendent Scotland could secure a derogation from the Schengen arrangements permitting continued 
free travel throughout the UK and Ireland, it would still be required to oversee a regulatory and 
customs border. The extent to which this matters in practice will clearly be shaped by the evolution 
of the relationship between the UK and the EU. The dominance of the Irish border during Brexit 
negotiations demonstrated the importance the EU attaches to the integrity of the single market and 
unearthed the complexities of border management between distinctive regulatory and customs 
regimes. These border issues could represent a significant barrier to securing support for independ-
ence in any future referendum.
In the case of Northern Ireland, ‘exit’ from the UK implies ‘re-entry’ into the EU via the reuni-
fication of Ireland. While the legal routes to re-entry in that context are somewhat clearer, the split 
loyalties in the north make both exit and re-entry fraught with difficulty. As the prospect has only 
begun to be given serious consideration, much about the process remains unclear. Murray and 
O’Donoghue (2019) noted that the principles and process set out in the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement suggest that reunification would involve stitching together two polities rather than 
subsuming Northern Ireland into the Republic of Ireland. This would require navigating immense 
constitutional, political, economic and public policy challenges, carrying the potential to breed 
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tension and instability on the island between North and South, as well as between unionists and 
nationalists. This may explain why most parties, Sinn Féin excluded, have been reticent about 
planning for the possibility of Irish unity. Prior to the 2020 general election, the Irish government 
had not produced any plans or proposals. In contrast to Sinn Féin’s proactive push for unity, the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is more cautious in its support of ‘progressive nation-
alism’ (Eastwood, 2016). This caution stems from sensitivity to unionism and concerns about the 
disruptive impact of a unification process. As Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar voiced during a debate in 
West Belfast:
I think it [reunification] would result in some of the mistakes made 100 years ago, when partition happened, 
being repeated but just the other way around – a huge number of people, those from a unionist, British, 
Ulster background, being brought into a united Ireland against their will (BBC, 6 August 2019).
For Northern Ireland, the legal process of re-entry to the EU is expected to be less fraught in the 
event of reunification. The Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol of the Withdrawal Agreement already 
stipulates that Northern Ireland will remain within the EU single market for goods, irrespective of 
the path taken by the UK government. This should make it easier to demonstrate that Northern 
Ireland had maintained the acquis in these areas. Moreover, Northern Ireland would not be seeking 
membership for itself, nor would it be required to establish the suite of new regulatory bodies nec-
essary for an independent EU member state. Rather, it is expected that reunification, from the EU’s 
vantage point, would see a redrawing of the boundaries of Ireland as an existing member state, 
much as East Germany assumed membership as part of Germany after reunification. When the 
European Council was agreeing guidelines for Brexit negotiations in 2017, former Irish Taoiseach, 
Enda Kenny, secured an additional declaration on Ireland:
The Good Friday Agreement expressly provides for an agreed mechanism whereby a united Ireland may 
be brought about through peaceful and democratic means; and in this regard, the European Council 
acknowledges that, in accordance with international law, the entire territory of such a united Ireland would 
thus be part of the EU (European Parliament, 2017).
This suggests a commitment on the part of the EU to facilitate Northern Ireland’s re-entry in the 
event of Irish unity. However, this could further distance it from the rest of the UK, creating more 
border barriers in the Irish sea. Maintaining a close and constructive relationship with the rest of 
the UK would be politically (and symbolically) important for Unionists in particular, as well as 
economically important for businesses throughout the island.
Conclusion
Adapting Hirschman’s framework to UK territorial politics, this article has identified that the 
Brexit referendum, and the process that unfolded thereafter, has disrupted the UK’s territorial con-
stitution, created limited opportunities for the devolved institutions to have an influential voice, 
and re-energised the politics of exit in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
We expected that the ethnocultural divisions that continue to dominate politics and representa-
tion in Northern Ireland would constrain both exit and voice. Certainly, the collapse of devolved 
government to which these tensions contributed meant that the institutional channels open to the 
Scottish government to advocate distinctive territorial preferences were not open to Northern 
Ireland. Even if they had been, finding common ground would have been difficult. Nationalist calls 
for ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland were utterly opposed by Unionists, who used their partisan 
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voice during a critical period of Theresa May’s premiership to block this outcome. The unquestion-
ing loyalty of Ulster unionists means they lack a credible exit option that, in the Hirschman frame-
work, might be expected to bolster voice. Their ability to influence UK policy in this period was 
down to parliamentary arithmetic. The Conservative Party’s sizeable victory in 2019 saw the DUP 
lose not just seats, but also its voice. Despite the nationalists’ ability to use the threat of exit to 
secure concessions, the suspension of Stormont and their lack of representation in Westminster 
during this period seriously compromised their ability to meaningfully affect the UK’s Brexit pol-
icy. On the other hand, the Irish government, through EU channels, had considerable influence in 
withdrawal negotiations. Their support for special status for Northern Ireland approximated the 
nationalists’ original ask. Consequently, the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement and the Ireland/
Northern Ireland Protocol reflected some nationalist concerns. This points to the complexity of the 
relationship between voice and exit in Northern Ireland. It is based on a diversity of messages 
delivered by different parties with opposing agendas, selectively targeting (supposed) allies and 
actors in Dublin, London and Brussels.
In Scotland, despite the legal barriers to holding an independence referendum, the electoral 
dominance of the pro-independence SNP makes exit a plausible strategy. But, contrary to our 
expectations, while the threat of independence was used to leverage Scotland’s voice in the Brexit 
process, its limited impact underlined that louder voices do not always lead to effective influence. 
The early promises of close intergovernmental cooperation to agree a UK approach to Brexit nego-
tiations came to very little. Three years of frustrated efforts to shape Brexit priorities, negotiations 
and outcomes exposed the limited opportunities to use voice in the absence of constitutional veto 
rights. In turn, this reaffirmed the SNP government’s preference for an exit route, with limited 
opportunities for an influential voice now used to generate support for exit, with some evidence of 
growing popular support.
The UK case has underlined the difficulties that can be generated by imposing majoritarian 
decisions in a territorially diverse society, especially when that diversity is manifested in divergent 
political preferences. There were no geographic thresholds to be met to legitimize the outcome of 
the referendum in the eyes of the Westminster elite. Like all referenda in the UK, the 2016 vote was 
non-binding legally, but was perceived to be binding politically despite the lack of consensus 
across the UK’s territorial communities.
Devolution was introduced as a strategy of territorial management and, in Northern Ireland, 
conflict resolution. Yet, Brexit has represented a shock to the system, destabilizing the delicately 
balanced territorial constitution and exposing the limits of devolved power in an otherwise central-
ized state. In a federal system, a constituent unit faced with a similar shock or challenge to its 
authority may be able to exert greater institutional voice. Channels of intergovernmental coopera-
tion and codecision tend to be more firmly institutionalized in federations, and constitutional or 
institutional vetoes used as leverage in intergovernmental bargaining. Devolution places no such 
constraints on the ability of central government to act, but our study has also underlined the limits 
and contingencies to which such a system can be subject. Faced with the shock of Brexit, and in 
the absence of institutional requirements or the political will to accommodate diverse preferences, 
the terms of the devolution settlement have proved vulnerable. As a strategy of territorial accom-
modation, devolution is always a process, not an event. It is never likely to be a permanent solution 
that eradicates calls for secession (or irredentism). Without careful management, secessionist goals 
can be re-ignited by a crisis or catalyst that undermines the political settlement.
Yet, when it comes to territorial communities, exit, were it to take place, is never final. Rather, 
it marks a step-change to a new relationship between the territorial community and the state it is 
leaving, as well as with the international community. Our concept of re-entry adds a new dimen-
sion to Hirschman’s framework when applied to the study of territorial politics. Comparing 
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re-entry across the two cases in advance of a hypothetical exit is of course impossible, but the 
article has illustrated the distinctive challenges that each territory would be expected to face. For 
Scotland, it would be seeking to rejoin the EU whilst negotiating a new relationship with rest of the 
UK that avoided a ‘hard’ Anglo-Scottish border. For Northern Ireland, whilst the route to Irish 
reunification and thus re-entry to the EU may be legally less fraught, the process would likely make 
internal divisions even more pronounced. These hypothetical scenarios colour contemporary 
debates. The future of the Union, and the place of Scotland and Northern Ireland within it, will be 
shaped fundamentally by the relationship that the UK develops with the EU. That relationship will 
be subject to its own dynamic. The more the UK withdraws from relations with the EU, the greater 
may be the strains at its internal boundaries. That creates dilemmas as well as opportunities for 
nationalists seeking the exit route. The appeal of exit will also be coloured by how the UK govern-
ment responds to these territorial challenges, and whether it creates or thwarts opportunities for 
territorial voices to be heard.
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